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End Notes

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THE LAST PHASE OF INSURGENCY TOWARDS TAMIL EELAM LIBERATION

Dr. G.M. Sunder Singh

Sri Lanka, once known as Ceylon is located in the Indian Ocean, twenty-one miles off the southern tip of India. This tiny island, which has twenty-two million people, is composed of a multi-ethnic and multilingual plural society. According to the *World Fact Book*, the majority, the Sinhalese people who speak the Sinhala language, represents 74.9 percent of the population, while the minority Tamils represents 15.4 percent and speaks Tamil. The two communities are divided along religious lines of Buddhism and Hinduism with a small minority of them, 7.4 percent, being Christians. Muslims on the island are the third largest ethnic group, representing 9.2 percent of the population and speaking both Sinhala and Tamil. The remaining 0.5 percent is comprised of other ethnic minority

groups such as the Malay, the Burgher, and indigenous people, the Vedda.

After Sri Lankan independence in 1948, malpractices in political, social, and economic arenas led the island into a volatile situation that culminated in a full-fledged civil war in the 1980s. The British colonial administration from 1815 to 1948 embraced a centralized and unified form of governing system on the island, which laid the foundation for neglect of the regions in Sri Lanka. After 1948, the ongoing prejudicial and ineffective policy decisions made by successive governments resulted in further tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, which eventually erupted into violence. From 1948 to 1994, two main political parties decided the development policies in Sri Lanka: the United

National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Many Tamils considered some of the constitutional legislation passed by the successive governments as discriminatory towards the minorities. By 1948, the Federal Party, later known as Tamil Arasu Katchi, led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, was at the forefront of the demands calling for the decentralization of administration for Tamils. Under the British administration, Tamils with good English language skills were offered higher positions in the government. But to their disappointment, Sinhala was made the only official language of independent Sri Lanka. By 1957, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Federal party leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam had come to an agreement with the aim to solve the ethnic problem on 26th July 1957.

The abolition of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement shaped the second wave of ethnic riots in 1958. Except for granting official status for the Tamil language for administrative purposes, from 1960 to 1977, no significant progress was made in the Government towards resolving the grievances of Tamils. By the mid-1970s, the Tamils had lost confidence in the ability of the Sinhala government to redress their grievances. By 1978, several Tamil militant groups had emerged in northern Sri Lanka to back the Tamils' cause for independence Tamil Eelam. The Tamil diaspora in the United States, mainly in Boston, managed to influence the U.S. authorities. With that influence, the lower house of the Massachusetts legislature adopted a series of resolutions pertinent to the conflict in Sri Lanka. In addition to the resolutions passed, "the Governor of Massachusetts declared 22 May 1979 'Eelam Tamils' Day' and handed over a copy of the resolution to M. Sivasitamparam, Amirthalingam's deputy, and President of the TULF. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who came to power in 1966, had cordial relations with Sri Lanka during Prime Minister Sirimao Bandaranaike's SLFP government. However, due to the power shift in 1977 where J. R. Jayewardene became the president, Gandhi's policies towards Sri Lanka also shifted. The consequences of the Cold War indirectly affected the Sri Lankan internal conflict in which India covertly supported the Tamil insurgents in terms of training and provided safe havens on Indian soil. Powered by external support, insurgents

began offensive action against the government. The immediate result was the massacre of thirteen military personnel by the insurgents on July 23, 1983, in Jaffna.

The LTTE initially developed as an insurgent organization, but later converted into a full-fledged terrorist organization and fought against the government forces to have a separate country for the Tamils on the island. Since its origin, the strategic vision and the final goal of the organization was to create an independent state for Tamils, Tamil Eelam covering 28.7 percent of Sri Lanka's land mass and 60 percent of its coastline.

To achieve its goal, the LTTE was engaged in an armed struggle of remarkable violence through a sustained campaign of guerrilla tactics, semi conventional military actions and terrorism. On May 5, 1976, a 21-year-old named Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the LTTE. After dropping out of school at age 16, he began to associate with Tamil 'activist gangs.' On one occasion as a gang member, he participated in a political kidnapping." As a youth, Prabhakaran initiated his first act of violence by setting fire to a state-owned public transport bus. Then he established himself as a cold-blooded man by killing Alfred Duriappa, the mayor of Jaffna. On 27th July, 1975 at the age of 21, Prabhakaran was among the initial members to form a militant group called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT); he became its co-leader. After taking over the control of his gang, Prabhakaran renamed the TNT the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since then, the LTTE grew to its apex in 2006 by having 25,000 cadres. Apart from the death of thousands of civilians, LTTE was also responsible for the killings of two heads of states, 104 politicians, 1,555 Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) personnel, 23,387 Sri Lankan security forces. To carry out its terrorist acts, the LTTE was organized into several components with Velupillai Prabhakaran as its leader. The organization's components included the Intelligence wing, Procurement wing, Military wing, Communication department, Research wing, Black Tiger wing, Sea Tiger wing, Air Tiger wing, and Political wing. By the mid-1990s 80 to 90 percent of the LTTE's military budget came from overseas sources, including both diaspora contributions and income from international investments and businesses. This large foreign income source helped the LTTE acquire modern

weaponry and military hardware such as artillery guns, heavy and medium mortars, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-surface missiles, surface to air missiles, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines, and small arms. Most importantly, by early 1990, the LTTE established its Air Tiger. The LTTE had obtained seven nonmilitary lightweight aircrafts through its front organizations abroad. Those aircrafts were smuggled to Sri Lanka and modified for offensive capabilities. From 1989 to 2009, the LTTE had destroyed 52 aircraft, including commercial aircraft, by using both missiles and ground attacks. To gain supremacy over the Sri Lankan Navy, the LTTE developed and maintained a formidable Sea Tiger wing. This wing had the capability of countering the security force actions through semi-conventional naval tactics and suicide missions. The effective intelligence network of the LTTE contributed to their success in both assassinations and suicide attacks. The political wing of the LTTE, headed by the leadership itself, gained its strength during the peace talks and ceasefire agreements, where it had influence over government institutions. Prior to the proscription by the international community, the LTTE front organizations have been set up in 54 locations in 32 countries around the world. Front organizations such as the World Tamil Forum (WTF), British Tamil Forum (BTF) and Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) were successful in leading the international community. The LTTE had efficiently used information and diplomacy as tools for their hybrid terrorism. The LTTE effectively used Sri Lankan Tamils residing in North America, Europe, and Asian countries to raise funds for the organization, thus, financing was never an issue.

According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), by the year 2000, at least eight non-profit organizations and five companies were operating in Canada as fronts for the LTTE. At one point, the LTTE had collected 80 percent of its annual operating budget through the Tamil diaspora. By 2007, this fund had reached an output of 200–300 million USD. When analyzing the suicide attacks carried out by various militant groups throughout the world, the number of suicide attacks by the LTTE placed it at the top of the list, the organization having been responsible for 168 such attacks during the period from 1980 to 2000. All the

members had cyanide capsules and they have shown little hesitation in consuming it, if captured. The LTTE started suicide terrorism by killing 40 security personnel when a truck full of explosives rammed into an army camp on July 5, 1987. Since that time, until November 20, 2008, 378 suicide bombers of the LTTE died in action. The LTTE was the first to use a suicide body suit in South Asia. A female LTTE suicide bomber, wearing a suicide body suit, assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in May, 1991. The LTTE also established a naval form of suicide attacks on vessels by using explosive-laden small boats.

THE SRI LANKAN EFFORTS

Since 1980, Sri Lanka applied the universally accepted theories and principles of counterinsurgency to defeat insurgency and terrorism on the island but could not achieve success until 2009. Since 1977, successive governments of Sri Lanka led by three presidents J. R. Jayewardene, R. Premadasa, and C. B. Kumaratunga applied both hard and soft aspects of counterterrorism, but could not defeat the LTTE. Finally, the government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa succeeded in defeating terrorism on the island in 2009. By 1983, the Sri Lankan military had struggled to face the escalating violence, therefore, the government was not in a position to conduct counterinsurgency. Their security forces and police were weak institutions and poorly trained.

During the Cold War in the 1980s, the changing international environment and the role of India affected the Sri Lankan government's actions on fighting the insurgency. Indian assistance for the LTTE was obvious during the period of President Jayewardene, when Eelam War I (1983–1989) occurred. While the Sri Lankan military was actively hunting Prabhakaran and the government was waiting to give Sri Lankan Rupees 300,000 for his head. On 19th May, 1982, Indian police arrested Prabhakaran while he was hiding in Tamil Nadu. Unfortunately, the extradition request by the Sri Lankan government was turned down. Jayewardene's government launched its counterinsurgency campaign in the Jaffna peninsula Operation Liberation in May 1987. Due to extensive diplomatic pressure from India, President Jayewardene had to accept a ceasefire agreement, and he signed the Indo-Lanka peace accord.

The Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) deployed in the north and the east of the island in July 1987. The LTTE neither surrendered its weapons nor co-operated with the implementations of the peace accord, but rather, engaged in fierce battles with the IPKF. The change of political leadership in both India and Sri Lanka thwarted the IPKF's role. Ranasinghe Premadasa succeeded President Jayewardene in January 1989. Rajiv Gandhi, the main power behind the Indo-Lanka peace agreement, lost his premiership in December 1989. With the strong protest against the IPKF by Premadasa's government, India was compelled to withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka in March 1990. The IPKF withdrew in fury after heavy losses, but not before roughing up, killing, looting and raping the Tamils who came within reach. During the Eelam War II from 1990 to 1994, the LTTE was successful in organizing its military capabilities to reach conventional levels. Dramatic assassinations of high profile political figures by the LTTE characterized this phase of the war with terror. The LTTE commenced this phase of war by attacking twelve police stations and killing 600 police officers who had been surrounded. In addition, hundreds of Sinhala civilians were also massacred. A suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne in March 1991. On May 21, 1991 Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on Indian soil by an LTTE suicide bomber. In May 1993, an LTTE suicide bomber assassinated president Premadasa. To force the LTTE to the negotiation table, President Kumaratunga's government continued the counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in heavy losses to both parties during the Eelam War III from 1995 to 2002. The counterinsurgency national plan of Kumaratunga's government war for peace was comprised of several offensive operations that were conducted with the aim of liberating the LTTE dominated areas. Operation Leap Forward and Operation Revirasa which were launched in 1995, managed to regain control south of Jaffna, including Jaffna town; however, it was estimated that nearly 2,500 had died, while another 7,000 were wounded on both sides. The next major offensives, "Operation Jaya Sikuru," and "Operation Rana Gosa," were launched in May 1997 and March 1999 respectively; both ended without much success. An isolated military base in Mullativu fell into LTTE hands on July 18,

1996. This battle alone caused the death of 1,200 military personnel and 332 LTTE fighters. The Elephant Pass military base, which was established at the entrance to the Jaffna peninsula, fell to the LTTE in December 1999. The LTTE bombed the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 1996 and in October 1997; another suicide attack by the LTTE destroyed the World Trade Centre building in Colombo metropolitan. The sacred "Temple of Tooth" in Kandy was attacked in January 1998; in addition, the assassination attempt of President Kumaratunga in December 1999 and the attack on Bandaranayke International Airport in July 2001 were among the other major suicide attacks. Winning the parliamentary elections of December 2001, Ranil Wickramasinghe of the UNP established a new government under SLFP President Kumaratunga. This had created a conflicting political environment on the island. At the same time, the Eelam War III ended with the unilateral cease-fire and declaration by the LTTE of their willingness to negotiate with the government for peace. The "no war, no peace" situation from 2002 to 2006 ended with failed negotiations but made the LTTE stronger.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa, successor of President Kumaratunga, came to power in November 2005 and continued with peace negotiations. However, the increasing atrocities of the LTTE made Rajapaksa's government recommence counterinsurgency operations by mid-2006. During this Eelam War IV, luck was not with the LTTE. The political will of President Rajapaksa, the neutral stance of India unlike in the past and international support created a favorable environment for the Sri Lankan government to defeat the LTTE. After nearly three years of sheer struggle with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE militarily on May 19, 2009. Apart from the military initiatives to defeat terrorism, political initiatives, too, had taken place extensively. Since 1983, all successive governments had engaged in peace negotiations to find solutions to the conflict. Negotiations for peace through external third party intervention, as well as domestic peace attempts were noticeable throughout the conflict. Under Jayewardene's government, the Thimpu peace talks in July 1985, the Indo-Lanka peace accord of 1987, and the IPKF action from 1989 to 1990 had failed to achieve peace. Even after the

recognition of Tamil as an official language, the LTTE did not give up the separatist movement. President Premadasa's government engaged in peace talks during the period from 1989 to 1990 but failed to achieve lasting peace. Under President Kumaratunga's government, once again several attempts for peace negotiation occurred. From October 1994 to March 2003, many rounds of peace talks were held in Jaffna, Sri Lanka; Thailand (three times); Norway; Germany; Japan; and Switzerland but "failed to contain or reduce violence and only extended the civil war.

The Norwegian-backed ceasefire agreement from 2002 to 2006 had the same results as previously but strengthened the LTTE's legitimacy. The defeat of the LTTE could not have been possible if the "war on terror" had not been declared by the United States because changes in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies of many powerful nations and international organizations contributed to enforce many restrictions on terrorism and its related activities worldwide. Therefore, due to this changed global environment, after 2001, international terrorism and insurgency were in decline. Hence, the government of Sri Lanka was able to take advantage of the situation to strengthen its counterinsurgency mechanism while the LTTE was not in a position to sustain its capabilities.

CONCLUSION

Since the time of Sri Lanka's independence, many badly formed policies of successive governments have provoked the divisions of the society on ethnic lines. Some of the legislation that was passed offended the Tamil minority. To show their dissatisfaction with government policies, peaceful demonstrations organized by Tamils often ended up in ethnic riots. The LTTE used peace talks to regroup and for training its members, therefore, at the end of every peace attempt, the LTTE emerged more powerful than before. The Sri Lankan government was able to win its thirty years of war against the LTTE mainly due to the changed external conditions on counterterrorism. Five major factors that contributed to the eventual and complete destruction of the LTTE, which itself was responsible for four of these." The first was the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Second was the LTTE's decision to pull out from the 2003 peace process, which annoyed the international community. The third factor was the split among the LTTE. Fourth was the actions by Tamils to boycott the presidential election of 2005 under pressure of the LTTE that paved the way to elect Mahinda Rajapaksa as the president. A high level of cooperation among the institutions under President Mahinda Rajapaksa's government was the fifth factor.

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FLOOD AND CYCLONE IN CUDDALORE, 2011 AND 2015 – A STUDY

I. Thamizharasan

Introduction

Natural disasters like cyclones, floods, earthquakes and landslides affect almost all countries in the world. They destroy substantial human and economic resources, and stand as formidable barriers against regional, national or global development at regular intervals, almost every year. Tropical cyclones can be considered to be the most destructive natural hazard when viewed in terms of their occurrence, intensity and area affected by the disaster.¹

Amongst the average of 80 to 90 cyclones recorded per year all over the world, at least five to six occur in the Indian subcontinent. India ranks high among the countries prone to cyclonic storms. This is because of the special nature of the coastline, the shallow coastal ocean topography and the characteristics of tides in the Bay of Bengal region. Further, the high density of population, low awareness of the community about cyclones and their risks, inadequate preparedness and cyclone warning systems add to the severity of the problem. India has a coastline of about 7,516 km, 5,400 km along the mainland, 132 km in Lakshadweep and 1,900 km in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.²

History of Cuddalore

South Arcot was a district in the Madras Presidency of British India. It covered the area of the present-day districts of Cuddalore, Viluppuram and Thiruvannamalai in the Indian

state of Tamil Nadu. The district was divided into eight taluks and covered a total area of 13,510 square kilometers (5,217 sq mi). The administrative headquarters was the town of Cuddalore.³

In ancient times, South Arcot was a part of the Chola and the Pallava kingdoms. British presence in the district dates to 1690 when the British East India Company set up a factory at Fort St David near Cuddalore. South Arcot was the scene of confrontation between the British and the French and the British and Tipu Sultan. The British took over the administration in 1781 and established full sovereignty in 1801.⁴

In ancient times, the northern part of South Arcot was under the rule of the Pallavas while the southern part was a portion of the traditional Chola homeland. In the 14th century, South Arcot was conquered by the Delhi Sultanate and later, by Vijayanagar kings. In 1646, South Arcot came under the Bijapur sultans who ruled till 1676, when it was conquered by the Marathas. In 1698, the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb took Gingee and established his rule over South Arcot.⁵

The British presence dates back to 1682, when the British East India Company established a factory at Cuddalore and Kanimedu. When these two failed, the Company set up another factory at Fort St David near Cuddalore.